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Abstract
Kenya currently hosts over four hundred thousand refu-
gees. In the last two decades it has turned towards a policy 
of containment in an attempt to confi ne refugees to its two 
rural camps, Kakuma and Dadaab. Kenya’s tolerance for 
the ongoing refugee problem which peaked in the 1990s 
due to major confl icts in the region is waning and concur-
rently issues of national security are growing. Th e Somali 
armed faction, Al-Shabaab, has been reportedly infi ltrat-
ing Kenya’s Somali refugee community. Recently, there 
have been reports that the government of Kenya has been 
covertly recruiting Somali refugees to return to Somalia to 
fi ght against Al-Shabaab. Th e use of refugees by Kenya to 
counter the threat of Al-Shabaab demonstrates a new per-
ception of outside threats and suggests that Kenya is now 
willing to sacrifi ce ideals of humanitarianism to secure its 
border with Somalia. Th e border remains offi  cially closed 
but thousands of refugees fl eeing the violence in Somalia 
continue to pour into Kenya.
To understand why Kenya is taking such a hardened 
stance towards refugee populations, it is important to 
comprehend Kenya’s strategic importance in East Africa. 
Secondly, in the complex relationship between internal 
factors and international pressures, one can discern the 
friction between adhering to the human rights of refugees 
whilst remaining a global player in the war on terror. A 
comparison of Kenya’s past treatment of refugees to its 
present position suggests that the nation’s most signifi cant 
priority is national security, and not remaining a haven for 
humanitarianism.
Résumé
Le Kenya accueille actuellement plus de quatre cent mille 
réfugiés. Au cours des deux dernières décennies, il s’est 
tourné vers une politique d’endiguement dans une tenta-
tive de circonscrire les réfugiés à ses deux camps en milieu 
rural, Kakuma et Dadaab. La tolérance du Kenya envers 
le problème persistant des réfugiés, problème qui a culminé 
dans les années 1990 en raison de confl its majeurs dans 
la région, diminue au moment même où des questions 
de sécurité nationale prennent de l’ampleur. Les factions 
armées somaliennes, les Shebab, infi ltreraient la com-
munauté des réfugiés somaliens au Kenya. On rapporte 
récemment que le gouvernement du Kenya aurait recruté 
secrètement des réfugiés somaliens en vue de retourner 
en Somalie pour lutter contre les Shebab. L’utilisation de 
réfugiés par le Kenya pour contrer la menace des Shebab 
témoigne d’une nouvelle perception des menaces extérieu-
res et suggère que le Kenya est maintenant prêt à sacrifi er 
les idéaux de l’humanitarisme pour sécuriser sa frontière 
avec la Somalie. La frontière reste offi  ciellement fermée, 
mais des milliers de réfugiés fuyant la violence en Somalie 
continuent d’affl  uer vers le Kenya.
Pour comprendre pourquoi le Kenya endurcit sa posi-
tion envers les populations réfugiées, il est important de 
comprendre l’importance stratégique du Kenya en Afrique 
de l’Est. En outre, dans la relation complexe entre facteurs 
internes et pressions internationales, on discerne une fric-
tion entre le respect des droits humains des réfugiés et le 
rôle d’acteur mondial dans la guerre contre le terrorisme. 
Une comparaison du traitement récent des réfugiés au 
Kenya à la situation actuelle suggère que la sécurité natio-
nale est la plus importante priorité de la nation.
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With the situation in Somalia deteriorating by the minute, 
time is of the essence. No one is feeling the pinch as much 
as Kenya. No one is feeling the pinch as much as Kenya. An 
infl ux of refugees and insecurity, indeed, Kenya is bearing the 
burden of the failed state in its neighbourhood. But Kenya’s 
inaction could be coming to an end.1
Kenya is dealing with several major concurrent crises: a humanitarian crisis, a political crisis, and a national security crisis. Th ese crises refl ect aspects 
of a national dilemma as Kenya struggles to deal with a 
continuous infl ux of refugees, major domestic political tur-
moil, and overt threats to its national security stemming 
from the Somali armed faction, Al-Shabaab. Prior to the 
refugee crisis beginning in the 1990s, Kenya had a laissez-
faire attitude towards refugee hosting because the size of the 
infl ux was much more manageable and refugees were not 
deemed a major threat to national security.2 However, in the 
early 1990s Kenya’s neighbours, mainly Sudan and Somalia, 
dissolved into confl ict, causing hundreds of thousands of 
refugees to seek asylum in Kenya. Th e infl ux overwhelmed 
Kenya’s capacity to manage the populations, and the gov-
ernment pushed for a policy of containing refugees in two 
camps, Dadaab and Kakuma. Dadaab is composed of three 
camps, Dagahale, Ifo and Hagadera. Dadaab is the name 
of the refugee site and collectively refers to all camps. At 
present, Dadaab is the world’s largest refugee camp and is 
dangerously over capacity.3 Kenya continues to host refu-
gees, albeit reluctantly, as it wishes to remain in good stand-
ing with the international community. However, its com-
mitment to East Africa’s refugee crisis is being sidelined by 
its own domestic strife and threats to its national security 
stemming from Somalia. Kenya is still reeling from the 
aft ermath of its election violence in 2008 and is on edge as 
the threat from Somalia was made all the more concrete 
when Al-Shabaab bombed Kampala, Uganda, in July 2010.4 
Consequently, Kenya’s tolerance for the ongoing refugee 
problem which peaked in the 1990s due to major confl icts 
in the region is waning and concurrently issues of national 
security are growing.
Kenya holds a strategic geopolitical position and its 
humanitarian, political, and security issues are of great 
regional and international concern. Much of East Africa’s 
stability depends on Kenya’s stability as it is the economic 
epicentre for the region, and Nairobi is home to regional 
headquarters for embassies, non-governmental organiza-
tions (NGOs), and the United Nations. Furthermore, Kenya 
is of major strategic interest in the global campaign against 
terrorism. In 1998 a truck loaded with explosives drove into 
the US embassy in downtown Nairobi, killing 214 people, 
most of them Kenyan nationals. Th is was followed by a 
bombing of an Israeli-owned hotel in Mombasa in 2002. 
Th ese bombings were both attributed to Al-Qaeda and ele-
vated Kenya into the international arena for the war on ter-
ror.5 It is in this context of the threat of externally based 
terrorism that Kenya has grown wary of armed factions, 
like Al-Shabaab, infi ltrating refugee populations residing in 
the country. Al-Shabaab is an organization that has been in 
operation since 2006 and although its primary eff orts have 
been to overthrow the Somali government it has also threat-
ened to attack Kenya in hopes of annexing Kenya’s North 
Eastern Province (NEP) into Somalia.6 Already having been 
a victim of terrorism, Kenya is taking the Al-Shabaab threat 
quite seriously.
Kenya has every right to take the Al-Shabaab threat ser-
iously. Al-Shabaab has been infi ltrating the Somali popula-
tion in Kenya to recruit more fi ghters and gain additional 
support. Recently, it has been reported by Human Rights 
Watch and other news agencies that Kenya is retaliating by 
infi ltrating the Somali community itself to recruit refugees 
to return to Somalia to fi ght alongside the opponents of 
Al-Shabaab, the Transitional Federal Government (TFG). 
Th ese refugees are vulnerable and disaff ected and there-
fore susceptible to both alleged recruitment processes. Th e 
alleged use of refugees by Kenya to counter the threat of 
Al-Shabaab may demonstrate a new perception of outside 
threats and suggests that Kenya is now willing to sacrifi ce 
ideals of humanitarianism to secure its border with Somalia. 
Th e border remains offi  cially closed but thousands of refu-
gees fl eeing the violence in Somalia continue to pour into 
Kenya. Th ese refugees are desperate for security, but Kenya 
is quite aware that where refugees manage to cross the bor-
der, Al-Shabaab fi ghters may follow.
To fully understand why Kenya is willing to take dras-
tic measures against Al-Shabaab and use refugees as pawns 
in the confl ict, it is important to understand Kenya’s past 
relationship with hosting refugees and the impact of its 
present policies on the ongoing crisis which began in the 
1990s. Secondly, Kenya is of great strategic importance to 
the stability of the region. Th us, it is pertinent to compre-
hend the core issues and key players of Kenya’s domestic, 
regional, and international infl uence, which cause friction 
in how it deals with refugee infl uxes. By using refugees as 
proxies in confl ict both Kenya and Al-Shabaab are dem-
onstrating the strategic convenience of such vulnerable 
populations. Finally, Kenya’s present stance on refugees 
illustrates that Kenya is in a position where it would rather 
assert its national security than honour humanitarianism 
because it is convinced it can no longer do both. Kenya is 
important to the stability and prosperity of East Africa and 
hence is feeling immense pressure from the international 
community not only to challenge the threat posed by 
Al-Shabaab but also to confront its major internal issues. 
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Kenya is facing a serious dilemma and perceives that it can-
not address its humanitarian crisis and its national secur-
ity crisis simultaneously. Hence, if the allegations are true 
that Kenya is recruiting refugees to return to Somalia and 
fi ght Al-Shabaab, then Kenya is clearly prioritizing national 
security over the human rights of refugees seeking asylum 
within its borders.
Kenya’s Relations with Refugees and the Refugee 
Crisis of the 1990s
Th e government of Kenya held a mostly laissez-faire atti-
tude towards the refugee population prior to the refugee 
crisis of the 1990s and the major domestic and external 
security threats that it faces today. A refugee is defi ned as 
someone who is forced to fl ee their home due to environ-
mental concerns, persecution, and protracted confl ict.7 
Generally, the term “refugee” is applied to a person who 
crosses international borders, while refugees who remain 
within the borders of their state are commonly referred to 
as “internally displaced persons” (IDPs.) Th e refugee prob-
lem was not as severe as it is today. In the 1970s and 1980s 
Kenya hosted a manageable number of 15,000 refugees, 
mostly from Uganda, who were allowed to self-settle and 
provided cheap labour.8 Prior to the 1990s, the government 
of Kenya was in charge of refugee status determination 
(RSD). RSD consists of a series of interviews conducted to 
determine whether the person qualifi es for refugee status 
and assistance. However, the government of Kenya ceded 
control to the UNHCR in the early 1990s with the onset of 
confl ict in Somalia and Sudan. Th ere were too many refu-
gees entering at once, which overwhelmed the government 
of Kenya’s capacity to register refugees and maintain con-
trol over the situation. In 1992 alone, Kenya’s refugee popu-
lation increased from 130,000 to 400,000 people.9 Kenya’s 
attitude towards refugees gradually shift ed from indiff er-
ence to great concern as it faced a major humanitarian crisis. 
Th e cross-border refugee crisis revealed to Kenya that it was 
incapable of assimilating and properly aiding the incoming 
populations. It also reminded Kenya that its borders were 
insecure, and that the confl ict that the refugees were fl eeing 
could potentially spill over the borders.10 Kenya was desper-
ate for resources to deal with the infl ux of people during 
that period, and confi ning the refugees to camps seemed 
the only feasible way of providing humanitarian assist-
ance while at the same time controlling the populations. 
Kenya has attempted to reassert its control over the prob-
lem of refugees, but since the 1990s, NGOs and the UNHCR 
remain the implementers of policy and Kenya the advisor. 
However, the UNHCR is still obliged to implement policies 
advised by Kenya, for example, ensuring that refugees are 
contained in Kenya’s two camps.
In the beginning of the 1990s the majority of refugees 
arriving in Kenya did not automatically settle in camps. 
Many were able to self-settle until government action in the 
1990s forced them to relocate to Kenya’s camps, including 
Dadaab, Kakuma, and coastal camps near Mombasa. Th e 
refugees in the coastal camps thrived in comparison to those 
placed in Kakuma and Dadaab. Th ey and the many refugees 
that self-settled relied on small businesses, such as selling 
electronics and clothing, which did not pay taxes. Powerful 
domestic economic segments of Mombasa and the coastal 
region prompted the government to close the coastal camps 
and eventually implement a policy of forced resettlement to 
Kakuma and Dadaab.11 Th ese camps have been operational 
since 1991 and 1992, since the onset of the war in Somalia 
and the emergence of the crisis in Sudan. Kakuma refugee 
camp is in the Turkana district of northwest Kenya, and 
Dadaab is in the NEP of Kenya near Somalia. Both of these 
regions are among the poorest in Kenya and prone to ethnic, 
economic, and political strife. Th e Organization for African 
Unity (OAU) Refugee Convention requires that refugee 
camps should be established at a “reasonable distance” from 
sending nations. Kakuma is only 125 kilometres from the 
Sudanese border and Dadaab is only 100 kilometres from 
Somalia.12
Despite adhering to OAU guidelines, these distan-
ces still allow refugee communities to be heavily infl u-
enced by the events taking place in their countries of ori-
gin. Consequently, as a result of where these camps are 
geographically situated, their security situation is best 
described by this statement by an Ethiopian refugee: “In 
both places, Kakuma and Dadaab there are soldiers and 
security agents. Th ey may kill me; those camps are so close 
to the border. So many times soldiers cross over to search 
for their opponents.”13 Th e proximity of the camps to the 
sending countries clearly is an invitation for confl ict to 
trickle over the borders. Refugee camps, in  general, can be 
microcosms for social and political instability, and with 
forced migration fl ows gravitating towards Kenya, meas-
ures were fi nally put in place in an attempt to deal with 
the horrendous local security situation that had arisen 
in both camps. Th e populations that occupy these camps 
are victims, and sometimes perpetrators, of violence. 
According to a police offi  cer in Dadaab, these refugees 
“have been brought up without justice and under the rule 
of the gun.”14 Th roughout the 1990s, as the security situa-
tion worsened, former Kenyan army offi  cers began to serve 
as security offi  cers in the camps. Th ey were brought in to 
support NGO staff  with major issues of security, and to 
develop a coordinated relationship between local govern-
ment, regional police, and the military.15 Police forces in 
both camps have been, and still are, disproportionately 
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too small to deal eff ectively with growing issues of secur-
ity. Additionally, most of the police posted to the camps 
are sent there forcibly and oft en treat the posting as a form 
of punishment.16 Even if they could be made to take their 
jobs seriously, the security problems of both Kakuma and 
Dadaab would remain complex and overwhelming.
Kakuma is situated in a remote desert, a region oft en 
affl  icted with famines, droughts, and general insecurity. Th e 
population in 2008 was estimated at roughly 50,000 people.17 
Th is camp was created initially to deal with Sudanese refu-
gees, but it quickly became a camp for over nine national-
ities, including Rwandan, Burundian, Congolese, Ethiopian, 
and Somali. Along with inter-group friction between these 
various nationalities, political insecurity in Kakuma is also 
attributed to the relationship between the local Kenyan 
Turkana tribe and the refugee populations. Th e region has 
little to no economy and the Turkana are threatened by the 
refugees’ presence. Th is has resulted in clashes, banditry, 
and cattle rustling by the Turkana against the camp and its 
refugees.18 Th e confl ict between diff erent ethnicities, tribes, 
and political affi  liations within the camp can be attributed 
to refugee adjustment in Kakuma, which depends on the 
political, religious, or ethnic affi  liations that bind them to 
the confl ict that they have fl ed. Th e primary example of 
political confl ict in Kakuma is that of the Sudan People’s 
Liberation Army (SPLA), an armed faction from Sudan. 
Th e SPLA not only recruited combatants from the Sudanese 
refugee communities within the camp itself, but also taxed 
and controlled the population to a varying degree.19 Th e 
infi ltration of Kakuma by the SPLA is the most signifi cant 
form of infi ltration that Kakuma has faced mostly because 
of the immense eff ect it had on dominating the Sudanese 
population at the time.
Th e camp has also faced infi ltration from Ethiopian 
government forces that were there to “deal with” for-
mer Ethiopian offi  cers.20 Th e government of Kenya has 
remained fairly unresponsive to the security issues that 
plague Kakuma.21 Occasionally the Kenyan military has 
intervened in clashes with the Turkana, but apart from that 
there has not been a dramatic response on its part concern-
ing the insecurity in the region. With the Sudanese popu-
lation largely repatriated back to Sudan, the noticeable 
problem of infi ltration by armed factions in Kakuma has 
subsided, at least to the extent that it is no longer a perceived 
threat. However, the border with Sudan and Kenya remains 
insecure. Recent news reports suggest that the confl ict with 
the SPLA is not over and that the group has set up bases 
on Kenya’s side of the border. Th is coincides with ethnic 
insecurity from both sides of the border which has continu-
ously made the establishment of a secure border extremely 
diffi  cult. In February 2010, for example, several Kenyan 
soldiers escorting a border control task force were killed 
by Sudanese armed factions.22 Unfortunately, these kinds 
of circumstances remain true for all of Kenya’s borders to 
the north. Th e infi ltration in Kakuma did concern the gov-
ernment of Kenya but it did not provoke a major reaction 
because the SPLA was not deemed a direct threat to Kenya’s 
national security, unlike the present issue with Al-Shabaab. 
Unlike Kakuma, infi ltration in Kenya’s other camp, Dadaab, 
has sparked not only reaction but also reprisal.
Dadaab has remained almost completely ethnically 
homogenous and at present is over its original combined 
capacity of 90,000 persons. Today, the three camps house 
over 260,000 refugees, most of whom are Somali, making 
it the largest refugee centre in the world.23 Th e refugees 
are mostly unemployed and two-thirds of the popula-
tion is younger than thirty-fi ve years old.24 Despite Kenya 
having closed the border to Somalia in 2007, over 50,000 
new refugees arrived in Dadaab in the fi rst nine months 
of 2009.25 Dadaab, like Kakuma, has had major security 
issues since it fi rst became an established camp. Apart from 
general insecurities related to crime, political insecurities 
that affl  ict the camp range from ethnic tension to religious 
extremism. When Ethiopia ousted the Union of Islamic 
Courts (UIC) from south-central Somalia in 2006, Kenya, 
threatened by the idea of UIC sympathizers fl eeing into the 
country, offi  cially closed the border and also began force-
fully deporting asylum seekers.26 Closing the border and 
forceful returns marked a new chapter in Kenya’s gradual 
shift  in refugee policy. Despite the UNHCR’s condemnation 
of Kenya’s actions, the border remains closed. However, it 
remains extremely insecure and border security forces are 
fraught with corruption, and thus the technical closure of 
the border has done little to prevent refugees from entering 
the country.27
Despite being more powerful and stable than most of its 
neighbours, Kenya has not been economically, socially, and 
politically powerful enough to provide dedicated support 
to asylum seekers. Kenya, too, has its own population of 
IDPs resulting from the election violence and has had dif-
fi culty addressing their needs and fi nding durable solutions. 
Furthermore, Kenya suff ers from its own internal problems 
such as famine, drought, and violence. Kenya may not be 
the most ideal haven for asylum but its geographic position 
makes it one of the most accessible countries for its neigh-
bours’ refugees to seek safety. International bodies, NGOs, 
and the United Nations pressure Kenya to welcome the 
refugees pouring over its borders, but there is concern about 
what implications these populations will have on Kenya’s 
sovereignty and security. When huge numbers of refugees 
arrive in a host state, the state is oft en perceived to be or 
is actually threatened economically, environmentally, and 
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culturally.28 Refugees require assistance which may fi nan-
cially burden the host state, and their settlements can nega-
tively aff ect the surrounding environment. For example, 
the reliance of refugees on fi rewood for shelter can cause 
deforestation.29 Th ese issues have caused Kenya great cau-
tion in the past and remain pertinent issues of the present. 
As wary as Kenya is of refugees and the problems that come 
with them, it has been unable to remain in full control of 
the crisis.
An assessment of Kenya’s response to the refugee crisis 
from the early 1990s onwards strongly suggests that Kenya 
has become less tolerant of refugees seeking asylum within 
its boundaries. Kenya’s poor political economy has made it 
incapable of, or unwilling to, adequately address the humani-
tarian concerns of the refugees crossing its many borders. 
Th is is further complicated by Kenya’s serious security con-
cerns about the state of aff airs in Somalia. Consequently, Dr. 
Peter Kagwanja of the African Policy Institute asserts that 
Kenya’s caution towards refugees is founded on several fac-
tors. Th ese factors include the lack of fertile land for refugee 
populations, caution towards ethnic Somalis who fought 
in the 1960s for the annexation of the NEP of Kenya, and 
popular apprehension that refugees foster the spread of fi re-
arms and cause higher levels of crime.30 Th ese fears have 
remained consistent from the 1960s. However, the experi-
ence of the 1990s and the real threat from Al-Shabaab have 
reignited these fears and caused the Kenyan government to 
allegedly take action. Th us Kenya, like many other states 
that host thousands of refugees, has implemented policies 
that are unfavourable in the eyes of humanitarian agencies. 
Th ese policies, targeting refugee populations, are the result 
of the host government deeming members of certain refu-
gee populations as potential threats to national security.
Kenya asserts that if it is to play host to refugees, they 
must remain under surveillance and in controlled environ-
ments: camps.31 Since the beginning of the crisis in the early 
1990s, Kenya has pushed for refugees to remain in camps, 
but it was not until aft er the Al-Qaeda bombing of the US 
embassy in 1998 and the bombings in Mombasa in 2002 
that the Kenyan government actively pursued this policy. 
Th e repression of refugee movement following these events 
consisted mostly of mass arrests of refugees in Nairobi. Th e 
Department of Immigration justifi ed these acts by stating 
that it was an assertion of Kenya’s Refugee Act and national 
security. Despite this public statement, there was no Kenya 
Refugee Act at the time. Th roughout the 1990s and the per-
iod following the Al-Qaeda bombings, there was in fact a 
draft  bill, but it was never passed by Parliament. On top of 
alluding to a nonexistent act, a senior immigration offi  cial 
noted in an interview with Guglielmo Verdirame of the 
London School of Economics and Political Science in 1999, 
“Refugees in Kenya misbehave because they do not want 
to go to the camps. If someone comes to my home and I 
tell him where he has to sit, he has to obey, otherwise he 
leaves!”32 By looking at Kenya’s gradual repression of refu-
gees throughout the 1990s and following the bombings in 
1998 and 2002, there are echoes of the present situation con-
cerning Kenya’s fear of refugees and the problems that come 
with them. Prior to the terrorist attacks, most of the restric-
tions only applied to refugees living in large urban centres 
such as Nairobi or Mombasa. Kenyan president Daniel arap 
Moi in 1997 issued a statement that sparked mass arrests of 
refugees and forced encampment:
President Moi yesterday said foreign spies and criminals masquer-
ading as refugees had invaded Nairobi. President Moi revealed 
that some of these criminals were engaged in incitement at the 
behest of local collaborators. Emphasizing that the government 
will not allow foreigners to abuse the peace and stability in the 
country, President Moi said many of them were engaged in busi-
ness as a cover-up for their evil activities.33
Perceiving refugees as potential threats is not a new per-
spective of the Kenyan government, as clearly demonstrated 
by the above statement. Closing the border to Somalia has 
done little to stem the fl ow of refugees. If anything, it has 
worsened the ongoing humanitarian crisis because it pro-
motes bribery and corruption among border offi  cials. It has 
also led to Kenyan police forcing refugees back into Somalia, 
an act that violates international law.34
Th e UNHCR, international governments, and NGOs 
have pleaded with the Kenyan government to provide 
more land for the Dadaab refugee camps. Th e severe over-
crowding in Dadaab is a humanitarian crisis. Th ere are not 
enough latrines or suffi  cient potable water due to severe 
issues of overcrowding.35 Th e human suff ering that goes on 
in these camps is intolerable. However, particularly from 
the stance of Kenyans and the Kenyan government, so are 
the conditions in which many Kenyans in the NEP have 
to live in. Th ese substandard conditions are due to a lack 
of available fertile land and the drought that affl  icted the 
region in 2009. At the end of March 2010, Kenya agreed to 
provide more land for Dadaab’s Ifo camp to accommodate 
80,000 more refugees.36 Th is is a major contribution from 
Kenya. However, the fact that aid agencies and international 
governments have been pleading with Kenya for years to 
provide land reveals Kenya’s hesitations in playing host to 
fl eeing Somalis. It seems Kenya has provided this land only 
because of extreme international pressure and it has been 
argued that the land is far from the amount needed.
As previously mentioned, before Kenya was fl ooded with 
refugees in the early 1990s, refugees enjoyed a substantial 
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amount of freedom, particularly freedom of movement. 
Many refugees settled in Nairobi. Consequently, despite the 
policy that refugees must remain in the camps, many, par-
ticularly Ethiopians and Somalis, live illegally in Nairobi.37 
Th eir neighbourhoods are well known and are frequently 
subjected to police raids. Th ese refugees are oft en arrested 
for a lack in documentation. Kenyan Vice President of 
Home Aff airs, Moody Awori, made a statement in 2004, 
pleading for all refugees in Nairobi to return to the camps:
I am asking all refugees to report to the camps and those that will 
be found to be in the city and other urban places without author-
ization will be treated like any other illegal aliens … Th e govern-
ment will soon mount a crackdown on these illegal aliens with a 
view to fl ushing them out.38
Since 2004, the government has been unable to fl ush the 
refugees out of Nairobi, particularly in the Somali suburb of 
Eastleigh. However, the police in Nairobi make their pres-
ence known with mass arrests. Th ese sweeps oft en coincide 
with major events such as the bombing of the US embassy in 
1998 and more recently aft er continuous threats espoused 
by armed factions like Al-Shabaab.39 Al-Shabaab has dir-
ectly threatened Kenya which has alarmed not only Kenya 
itself but also the international community who deem that 
much of East Africa’s stability rests on Kenya’s stability and 
security.
Kenya’s Strategic Importance: Core Issues 
and Key Players
Th ere is a saying, “When Kenya sneezes, East Africa catches 
a cold.”40 Kenya is the epicentre for East African economic, 
political, and humanitarian discourse. It is a major player 
regionally and internationally because, until recently, it has 
been one of the most prosperous and politically stable coun-
tries in East Africa. To understand the present decision to opt 
for national security over humanitarianism, it is important 
to understand Kenya’s major domestic issues, which cause 
it to be more wary of refugees, as a result of heightened vul-
nerability to external attack. Th e international and regional 
community is pressuring Kenya to address these issues so 
that it can remain a valuable player in international dis-
course and a recipient of donor money. Some of these major 
domestic issues came to the fore in December 2007 during 
Kenya’s federal elections. Accusations that the election was 
rigged provoked national civil unrest with waves of eth-
nic and gang-related violence.41 Th e election violence left  
nearly one thousand people dead and thousands of people 
displaced. It reminded the international community that 
Kenya, despite being stable in comparison to its troubled 
neighbours, is not the rock of East Africa that it was thought 
to be. It revealed Kenya’s troubling ethnic issues and polit-
ical corruption but also demonstrated how much the whole 
of East Africa relies on its stability.
Despite being considered a developing country, Kenya 
has a fairly developed infrastructure compared to its neigh-
bours, who depend on Kenya’s roads and harbours for 
shipping. Kenya borders fi ve countries: Tanzania, Uganda, 
Sudan, Ethiopia, and Somalia. Some of these countries are 
highly dependent on the Northern Corridor, which is a vital 
road network that connects Kenya’s neighbours to its busy 
harbour in Mombasa. During the election violence, this 
road was blocked and many countries were hard-pressed to 
receive vital shipments of fuel and essential goods.42 East 
African businesses also rely on Kenya because it is home to 
East and Central Africa’s most signifi cant stock exchange, 
the Nairobi Stock Exchange.43 Kenya’s election violence 
hurt the entire region economically. Some countries were 
so desperate for Kenya to stabilize that even the president 
of Rwanda, Paul Kagame, was ready to call for a military 
intervention in Nairobi.44 Not only were Kenya’s neigh-
bours anxious for the violence to end, but so was the inter-
national community. Many international organizations 
and governments have their regional headquarters based 
in Nairobi. Th e majority of international governments’ and 
NGOs’ economic, political, and humanitarian programs for 
the region are headquartered in Nairobi. Many of these pro-
grams stalled as Kenya went up in fl ames.
Fortunately a military intervention was not necessary 
and the violence ceased aft er two months.45 At present, 
Kenya remains politically unstable; it has failed to address 
the fundamental issues of ethnic tension and political cor-
ruption. Th e international community continues to pres-
sure the government to resolve these issues so that it can 
continue with its missions and programs. Th e government 
of Kenya has been actively trying to convince international 
players and its neighbours that it is legitimately trying to 
address its major internal issues and prevent a reoccurrence 
of the violence witnessed in 2007. However, continuing cor-
ruption and false promises leave many Kenyans with little 
to no faith in their government. For example,
President Mwai Kibaki of Kenya faced a moment of public embar-
rassment on 12 December 2009 when he was unable to complete 
his independence-day speech because of heckling from the crowd. 
But this was far from an opposition-organized ruckus. Some 
weeks earlier, his political competitor (and the prime minister) 
Raila Odinga could hardly speak to a gathering of his support-
ers who countered his slogan of chungwa! (‘orange’, denoting his 
party) with shouts of unga! (maize-fl our, i.e. ‘we are hungry’).46
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To add to its diffi  culties, Kenya suff ered from a severe 
drought that led to famine in September 2009. Millions of 
Kenyans were forced to rely on emergency food aid from the 
World Food Program (WFP) to confront severe food short-
ages.47 In context with the refugee crisis, it is diffi  cult for 
Kenyans to want to help their neighbours when they seem 
unable to help themselves.
Furthermore, the government has also failed to address 
ethnic tension and severe issues of crime. Th ese issues are 
compounded by the fact that Kenyans are frustrated with 
the government’s additional failure to address the secur-
ity issues stemming from the confl ict in Somalia. Despite 
excessive military spending, the government has done little 
to convince its citizens that they are safe from the confl icts 
outside its borders. Th ese issues are exacerbated by pressure 
from the international community for Kenya to address 
all the issues that are related to the election violence and 
at the same time welcome thousands of refugees coming 
from the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Sudan, 
and Somalia. Confronted with so many fundamental secur-
ity issues, the government of Kenya evidently by its present 
actions deems that it must confront its greatest perceived 
threat, Al-Shabaab, before it can restore order within its 
own boundaries.
Somalia and the Al-Shabaab Problem
Al-Shabaab is a militant Islamic group that has fought 
against the Somali transitional government since 2006. Th e 
size of the organization is unknown, but estimates range 
from 6,000 to 7,000 fi ghters.48 Al-Shabaab has relied on 
guerilla tactics that include suicide bombings and assassina-
tions. By February 2009, the group had ousted other rival 
armed factions and controlled most of southern Somalia. 
Although Al-Shabaab began as a militant group focused 
on domestic politics within Somalia, aft er open threats by 
Al-Shabaab against Ethiopia and now Kenya, the group has 
made a gradual shift  from Somali national politics to East 
African regional politics. Th is shift  is related to the region’s 
support for the TFG in Mogadishu. Ethiopia’s militant 
ousting of the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC), a group of 
Somali Islamists, from government in 2006 sparked threats 
from Al-Shabaab against Ethiopia.49 Al-Shabaab has openly 
threatened Kenya in the last year, at least in part because 
Kenya has attempted to combat piracy, which demonstrates 
Kenya’s new activism against external threat. Kenya has 
also actively attempted to secure its border against armed 
factions. Th e International Crisis Group (ICG) states, 
“Al-Shabaab’s threat to strike Kenya, which could reason-
ably be dismissed as bravado, may become real. Al-Shabaab 
has honed its terror tactics and skills in recent years and is 
now by far the deadliest guerilla movement operating in the 
Horn.”50 Th e danger to Kenya from Al-Shabaab is no longer 
a perceived threat sparking precaution but a real menace. 
Th e group wants to expand its territory and now threatens 
the security of Kenya’s NEP.
Kenya’s ethnic Somali and Muslim populations mostly 
live in the NEP and along the southeastern coast. Although 
Kenyan citizens, these populations are politically and eco-
nomically marginalized, making these regions prosperous 
recruiting grounds for groups like Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda. 
It is well known that Kenya has been used by Al-Qaeda in 
the past as a point of transit.51 Th erefore, because Kenya has 
a large Muslim population that is vulnerable to recruitment 
and a history with terrorism, it is fair to assume that Kenya is 
taking the Al-Shabaab threat seriously. In the last year open 
threats from Al-Shabaab against Kenyan sovereignty have 
been increasing. For example, a song was released by the 
organization in January 2010 cautioning Kenya of its pres-
ence: “We have arrived at the border, we will enter Kenya, 
and Inshallah we will get to Nairobi … when we get there, 
we will fi ght, we will kill, because we have weapons, enough 
weapons.”52 Th e affi  rmations made by refugees and NGO 
workers in Dadaab, one of Kenya’s refugee camps, assure the 
Kenyan government that Al-Shabaab has not only arrived 
at the border, but has infi ltrated the country and is spread-
ing within. In an interview with a Dutch news agency one 
Somali refugee stated, “Al-Shabaab operates here in Kenya. 
I expect terrorists will strike here.”53 Other refugees go as 
far as to state that Al-Shabaab fi ghters come across the bor-
der not only to recruit and strengthen the organization, but 
also to rest from the fi ghting and seek treatment in Kenya’s 
hospitals.54
Many refugees who have been interviewed on the subject 
acknowledge that Al-Shabaab’s purpose in Kenya is to gain 
support in Somalia by radicalizing disaff ected refugees and 
Kenyan Muslims to further alienate the TFG from its neigh-
bours.55 Consequently, if the TFG falls, it is highly predict-
able that the horrors that go on in Somalia will spill over 
into Kenya, a country that is already unstable and politically 
fragile. Th is fragility is compounded by the signifi cantly 
high numbers of Somali refugees living within Kenya’s bor-
ders. In interviews with journalists many Somali refugees 
state that they do not support Al-Shabaab, as they do not 
believe in its use of violence as a means to implement Sharia 
law in Somalia. However, the group has been successful in 
recruiting young men and boys to return to Somalia to fi ght. 
Ahmed Hussen, president of the Canadian Somali Congress, 
noted that joining Al-Shabaab is a “one way ticket … you 
don’t come back.”56 Despite this known fact, most of these 
recruits are enticed to join in order to earn some income. 
Th ese youths are disaff ected and therefore ideologically 
vulnerable to the messages delivered by the recruiters to 
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persuade refugees to fi ght in Somalia. Al-Shabaab’s infi l-
tration of Kenya’s refugee community demonstrates the 
strategic use of refugees in war and reiterates that Kenya’s 
borders are hugely insecure and vulnerable to attacks. If 
Al-Shabaab topples the TFG in Mogadishu, Kenya’s territor-
ial integrity could face severe consequences.
In the context where Kenya has been a victim of ter-
rorism before and is under immense pressure from inter-
national actors like the UK and the US to tackle terrorist 
cells infi ltrating the country, one can begin to piece together 
the present situation of Kenya’s reaction to refugees. Kenya’s 
response of repressing refugee populations outside of 
the camps and closing the border is not supported by the 
humanitarian agencies but it is a clear response to a per-
ceived crisis and threat to national security. What is not 
predictable is the allegation that the Kenyan government 
has launched a program that recruits Somali refugees in 
Dadaab to return to Somalia and fi ght against Al-Shabaab. 
Testaments from refugees and reports issued by Human 
Rights Watch and news agencies insist that Kenyan govern-
ment offi  cials have been sending recruiters into the camp 
to recruit men to fi ght in Somalia. Th e recruits are told that 
they will be fi ghting with the UN and the US alongside 
the TFG against Al-Shabaab and they are promised fi nan-
cial compensation of four hundred to six hundred dollars. 
One refugee, Daud (age eighteen), interviewed by Human 
Rights Watch, said that these recruiters play not only on the 
refugees’ fears of Al-Shabaab but also on their hopes of con-
tributing to the rebuilding of their country. Daud said he 
was approached and was impressed by the thought of earn-
ing such a substantial amount of money. He was driven in 
a shuttle bus and dumped in a desert outside of Mombasa 
with other recruits. Th ey were later picked up by Kenyan 
military and National Youth Service vehicles and led to a 
training centre. In the interview with Human Rights Watch, 
Daud said that on the way to the training centre their 
phones were confi scated and it was revealed to them that 
they would not be making the amount of money promised. 
He and a few other recruits then jumped out of the truck 
and escaped.57 Government offi  cials have denied these 
accusations. However, local offi  cials and offi  cials in Somalia 
confi rmed that these accusations are based on fact. TFG 
General Yusuf Dhumal in a press conference in Mogadishu 
stated that Somalia and Kenya have entered into an agree-
ment to recruit soldiers from the NEP of Kenya and that 
these recruits were being trained outside of Mombasa.58 
Despite that, he did not explain that this recruitment was 
targeting refugees, likely because this would be tantamount 
to confessing to violating human rights.
If these accusations are true, then Kenya is in viola-
tion of international human rights and may also suff er the 
consequences of encouraging a response from Al-Shabaab. 
By infi ltrating Dadaab to recruit Somali refugees to fi ght in 
Somalia in response to the Al-Shabaab presence in Kenya, 
the government of Kenya is violating international law that 
states that refugee camps are meant to be purely impartial 
humanitarian spaces. Another violation of human rights 
is the allegations that some of the refugees who have been 
recruited have been under fi ft een years old and thus are 
child soldiers.59 Th is drive compromises refugees’ rights 
to seek asylum in a neutral territory. Furthermore, as a 
UN offi  cial stated to Human Rights Watch, “Recruiting 
Somali refugees and sending them back to Somalia to fi ght 
Al-Shabaab is an open invitation for reprisal.”60 Likewise, 
an Al-Shabaab administrator in Dhobley, a border town 
in Somalia, Sheikh Mahammed Arab, issued a report that 
the Kenyan military has been building up along the bor-
der substantially. He stated, “We have the information 
about heavy military movement along the border between 
Somalia and Kenya. We don’t know the meaning of this but 
we are warning of repercussions for any aggression.”61 By 
relying on overt and covert aggression against Al-Shabaab 
in these ways, Kenya could be worsening the security situa-
tion instead of aiding it. Furthermore, its reported neglect 
of refugees’ rights to asylum may sacrifi ce its humanitarian 
integrity in the face of international players.
Dr. Francis Deng, UN Special Advisor for the Prevention 
of Genocide and Mass Atrocities, writes of the idea of “sover-
eignty as responsibility” to assert that a nation’s territorial 
integrity may be temporarily violated in order to create shel-
ters for refugees. Th e responsibility of the state, which is to 
protect the human rights of all people within its boundaries, 
is rewarded through international recognition and, in the 
case of Kenya, humanitarian aid. Th is model also asserts 
that a state’s credibility is based on its adherence to human 
rights.62 Th e complexities of this scenario apply to Kenya. 
Kenya is a huge recipient of international aid and is the 
hub for the United Nations’ regional headquarters for East 
Africa. Th erefore, to continue receiving these benefi ts (for 
example, remaining a recipient of donor money and play-
ing host to a large diplomatic community that stimulates its 
economy), Kenya has to actively engage itself in the humani-
tarian problems in the region. Sacrifi cing humanitarian 
integrity may seem the only realistic option for Kenya. It is 
not only burdened by the failed states in its neighbourhood, 
but it has realized that it, too, may become a failed state.
Th e refugee problem raised further concern following 
the election violence in Kenya. Th is produced a situation 
in which Kenya found itself having to deal with its own 
displaced persons and not just those from its neighbours. 
Politically vulnerable, the Kenyan government has also had 
to deal with external political pressure. Th e threat from 
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Al-Shabaab to Kenya’s political and territorial integrity is 
not a threat that Kenya can choose to ignore. Kenya’s large 
marginalized Muslim and refugee populations make it vul-
nerable. By recruiting Somali refugees in Kenya, Al-Shabaab 
intensifi ed the potential threat of refugees to Kenya’s secur-
ity as a nation-state. Like Al-Shabaab, Kenya has realized 
the strategic value of using refugees for their own ends. 
Although it originally deemed refugees a nuisance, the gov-
ernment of Kenya has been able to counter Al-Shabaab’s 
strength in the Somali refugee communities by infi ltrat-
ing these communities itself. By using refugees as pawns in 
the war against Al-Shabaab, the Kenyan government may 
alienate humanitarian organizations and donor nations. As 
previously mentioned, it could also invite reprisals from 
Al-Shabaab. Th ese seem to be the risks that the govern-
ment of Kenya is willing to take. Weighing the alternative 
of waging an overt invasion in to Somalia to tackle the 
Al-Shabaab threat, Kenya may also deem that being repri-
manded by the international community is another risk it 
is willing to accept. Th is has led Kenya to renegotiate its 
stance on guarding refugee rights. Th erefore, relying on 
refugees for a covert intervention in Somalia allows Kenya 
to spare its forces and at the same time confront the threat 
to its territorial integrity with deniability. For the Kenyan 
government, it may appear to be win-win situation: send the 
refugees back to Somalia and give them the means to take 
matters into their own hands, and at the same time counter 
the threats from Al-Shabaab. Moreover, if these allegations 
of Kenya recruiting within the refugee populations remain 
just that, allegations, then the government of Kenya can 
remain in good light to the international community and 
donors.
However, the complexity of the situation demonstrates 
that Kenya is a vulnerable state that is suff ering from severe 
internal disorders; it has an enormous refugee population 
that continues to grow day by day; and it is being threat-
ened by an armed faction which is fully capable of playing 
on the refugee crisis for the advancement of their strategy. 
Kenya has to address all of these issues, which may aff ect 
its security or its integrity as an international player. Th e 
biggest priority is to address its internal problems, which 
were revealed in the election violence of 2007. However, it 
is unable to fully focus on these internal problems with 
Al-Shabaab at its door and following the refugees as they 
pour in. Th ese problems are compounded by the refugee 
crisis because Kenya lacks the resources to fully address the 
needs of these people and is continuously pressured by the 
international community to do something. In any case, as 
demonstrated, Kenya can barely feed and care for its own 
citizens let alone thousands of refugees who may or may not 
be enemies of the state.
Th e massive refugee crisis that began in the early 1990s 
has yet to end. Kenya has become intolerant of so many 
people pouring across its borders and seeking its assistance. 
It attempted to solve its problem by forcing refugees to settle 
in camps at the peripheries of the country; however, these 
refugee camps became fertile recruitment grounds for the 
SPLA and Al-Shabaab. Since the SPLA issue was not taken 
seriously, Kenya deemed the camp a UNHCR problem. 
Th roughout the 1990s as evidence mounted that refugees 
were easily circumventing camp policy to live in Nairobi, 
and especially following the terrorist bombings of the US 
embassy in Nairobi and the hotel bombings in Mombasa, 
Kenya took a harder line on handling refugees. Once 
Al-Shabaab began infi ltrating the country from within 
and threatening to attack, the government of Kenya lost 
its remaining tolerance for any humanitarian aff airs that 
compromised its security. Kenya’s fragility as a state and its 
internal strife, coupled with the threat posed by Al-Shabaab, 
are demonstrating that Kenya is no longer willing or able to 
treat its refugee crisis as a problem requiring a humanitar-
ian solution.
As Jeff  Crisp notes, quoting a UNHCR offi  cial who aptly 
describes the problems of Kenya’s refugee camps, “You can-
not create an island of security in a sea of insecurity.”63 Th is 
statement is true of the refugee camps but also of Kenya as 
a whole. Kenya once upon a time was seen as an island of 
security but times have changed. Kenya’s neighbours have 
failed to solve their problems in the last twenty years, and 
if they did, new ones quickly arose. Creating an island of 
Kenya in this sea of insecurity is a mighty feat because 
Kenya is fraught with insecurity from within and from 
without, and is confronting an unending refugee crisis of 
epic proportions.
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